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1 Introduction 
Electricity reform in Australia has been a comprehensive failure since the creation of the National 
Electricity Market (NEM) in the 1990s. None of the objectives of lower prices, greater system 
reliability or environmental sustainability have been met. The core aim of policy should be a 
genuine National Electricity Grid, driven by the goal of providing secure, affordable electricity to 
Australian households and businesses while reducing and ultimately eliminating emissions of 
carbon dioxide (CO2). The current NEM is not designed for this purpose and cannot achieve it. 
Rather, it is the product of a late 20th century ideological project, in which it was hoped that 
market incentives could outperform rational system design and management in the electricity 
supply industry. Nearly 20 years of unsatisfactory experience has proved that this is not the case, 
even for a traditional system based on coal-fired generation. 
Until relatively recently, most attention has been paid to the dramatic increases in the cost of 
electricity, driven primarily by the increased rate of return required for commercial investments in 
distribution networks, as compared to the former statutory authority model. However, recent 
failures of the transmission network in South Australia, Victoria and Tasmania have focused 
attention on the inadequacy of the national grid itself, and the fragmentation of responsibility 
between the electricity generators, owners of state transmission networks and interconnectors 
and multiple regulators. 
The appropriate policy solution is a unified, publicly owned, National Grid encompassing the 
ownership of physical transmission networks in each state and interconnectors between states, 
and responsibility for maintaining security of supply and planning the transition to a sustainable, 
zero emissions electricity supply industry. 
There is a strong case for extending the role of public ownership to include renationalisation of 
electricity distribution in addition to transmission, and for public investment in renewable energy. 
 
2 Background 
In principle, the Independent Review into the Future Security of the National Electricity Market 
(NEM) should provide an opportunity to reconsider the reasons for the failure of market-oriented 
electricity reform. Unfortunately, the starting point for the Review is the assumption that the 
National Electricity Market is a system that was well designed for an electricity supply industry 
based on fossil fuels but that needs reform in the light of the unanticipated effects of the growth 
of renewable energy. This assumption is false in two crucial respects. 
 
First, even for a fossil-fuel only system, the NEM was poorly designed. Not only have the 
anticipated benefits not materialised, but the performance of the system has actually gone 
backwards. Prices have risen instead of falling and the National Grid has not lived up to its 
potential. The reasons for this failure are discussed at length in my report Electricity Privatisation 
in Australia: A Record of Failure, released in 2014. 
 
Second, the claim that the system was designed for a world without renewables is over-
generous. The history of the National Electricity Market (beginning with a COAG meeting in 
1992) coincides almost perfectly with that of the UN Framework Convention 
on Climate Change (adopted in May 1992). The NEM began operating in 





Energy Target in 2001. Throughout the existence of the NEM, the designers of the NEM have 
failed to take adequate account of the need to reduce CO2 emissions in general, and of 
renewable energy in particular.    
Had the importance of CO2 emissions and renewables been taken into account in the original 
design of the NEM, as it should have been, some policy mistakes might have been avoided. For 
example, costly errors like the decision to refurbish the Hazelwood plant might have been 
prevented.  
However, such adjustments would not have overcome the fundamental problem. Reliance on 
decentralised, profit-driven investment decisions will never yield sensible outcomes in the 
provision of complex infrastructure networks in which a number of competing policy and social 
concerns must be balanced. 
 
3 The failure of the NEM 
The National Electricity Objective, as stated in the National Electricity Law is: 
to promote efficient investment in, and efficient operation and use of, electricity services for the 
long term interests of consumers of electricity with respect to – 
1. price, quality, safety, reliability, and security of supply of electricity; and  
2. the reliability, safety and security of the national electricity system. 
This objective has clearly not been met by the existing system. The main failures are: 
(a) Pricing: electricity prices have risen greatly, reversing a long-term declining trend under 
the previous system of integrated publicly owned electrify supply systems. 
(b) Reliability: the shift to market-based systems was followed by a series of supply failures, 
which necessitated costly investment in distribution networks at high cost to consumers. 
(c) Quality: competition has led to substantial churn in retail markets, but customer 




(d) Efficient investment: the pricing system has not delivered coherent signals for 
investment. In particular, the existing system has failed to cope with the entry of 
renewables. 
(e) Efficient operation: resources have been diverted from operational functions to 
management and marketing, resulting in higher costs and poorer service. 
These failures are not accidental. Rather they can be explained by fundamental and incurable 
flaws in the NEM model of pricing, regulation and incentives for investment. Marginal 
adjustments such as those being proposed at present will inevitably prove inadequate. The only 
satisfactory option is a substantial shift away from reliance on artificial markets and the 
introduction of strategic and operational planning for the national grid. 
Advocates of the reform process have claimed that the poor outcomes are due to the fact that 
the ultimate goal of the process, privatisation of the entire system has not been achieved in 
 
  3 
AITI (2017) 
Queensland nor, until recently, in New South Wales1. This claim is belied by the fact that similar 
problems (differing in detail, but with the same outcome as regards rising prices) have been 
observed in all states in the NEM regardless of the extent of privatisation. 
A second, more recent claim is that renewable energy is to blame. Although popular on the 
political right, where energy policy is driven by ‘culture war’ attitudes, this claim has been rejected 
both by expert analysts and the general public.   
Figure 1: Melbourne and Australian electricity indices compared 
 
Source: ABS (2013) Consumer Price Index, Australia, Dec 2012, Cat no 6401.0, 23 January. 
3.1 Labour costs and productivity 
One of the primary aims of the NEM reforms was to drive improvements in labour productivity. 
Efforts to reduce perceived overstaffing and featherbedding were directed primarily at technical 
and trade workers, who experienced successive waves of redundancies over the past decade.  
However, these reductions in employment have been more than offset by increases in the 
number of managers, sales workers and marketing professionals needed to operate in the new 
market framework.  
A study of the electricity, gas and water industries undertaken by the Australia Institute found that 
the number of technical and trades workers employed in these industries had grown by less than 
the workforce as a whole between 1997 and 2012 (28 per cent as opposed to 37 per cent). By 
contrast, the number of managers had more than doubled, HR and marketing professionals had 
                                                   
1 Such claims are characteristic of all failed policy programs from the claim that ‘communism has never really been tried’ to Ayn 





more than tripled, and the number of sales workers had risen by 500 per cent. At the beginning 
of the period, technicians outnumbered managerial and retail staff.  By the end, the reverse was 
true. In particular, ‘in 1997 there was a manager for every 13 workers, but by 2012 there was a 
manager for every nine workers’.  
3.2 The failure of the pricing model 
In a theoretically ideal competitive market, prices perform at least four distinct functions. 
1. Prices provide a signal to consumers about the social cost of the product they are 
consuming. Consumers will buy the product if, and only if, its value to them exceeds the 
price, which represents the value of the resources used to produce it. 
2. Conversely, prices provide a signal to producers about the value of their product. Firms 
will produce more (or less) if the price is greater (or less) than their cost of additional 
production. 
3. In addition, prices provide a signal to firms on whether to invest in additional production 
capacity.  If prices are high, and expected to remain so for some time, the industry will 
attract new investment. If prices are low, there will be no new investment and existing 
capacity will be scrapped or allowed to run down. 
4. Finally, competitive prices ensure that, in the long run, firms earn the market rate of 
return on the capital they have invested, no more and no less. 
The designers of electricity markets have attempted to reproduce all of these outcomes but have 
failed. There are several critical problems.  
First, there are problems generic to network infrastructure industries. The physical network is a 
natural monopoly which means the market is best served by a single set of wires or pipes. In the 
absence of regulation, a monopolist will charge prices that are too high, with the result that they 
will not perform their signalling functions properly. Consumers will get less than they should at a 
higher price, profits will be excessive and investment will be distorted.  
These problems can be reduced, though not eliminated completely, by comprehensive price 
regulation. But when privatised firms are regulated in this way, their primary incentive is to ‘game’ 
the system to secure higher returns. This often entails delaying investment (a pattern seen with 
Telstra on broadband. 
Another problem is specific to electricity. Because electricity can only be stored at high cost, 
using batteries or pumped storage, the cost of additional generation can fluctuate wildly. When 
all available generation capacity is in use, additional demand can only be met by such measures 
as ‘load-shedding’. The Australian pool market price of power can rise as high as $10,000/MWh, 
and even this is not high enough for the market to perform as it supposed to. On the other hand, 
the price can be zero or even negative on nights when demand is low and operators prefer to 
keep their plants running than to shut them down and restart the next day. 
Because the balance of supply and demand fluctuates greatly over short periods and because 
sources of electricity vary in their supply characteristics, pool price models are unable to achieve 
these objectives. 
On the demand side, most consumers face fixed prices, and therefore take no account of the 
actual cost of the electricity consumed at any given time. Attempts to address this problem 
through ‘smart meters’ have so far had little if any success. 
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4 Private rates of return 
Electricity networks are highly capital-intensive. As a result, the cost of electricity is 
predominantly determined by the capital value of the network and the rate of return earned by its 
owners.  In the pre-reform era, public electricity enterprises funded their investment by issuing 
bonds, normally at a small premium to the government bond rate.  In some cases, governments 
guaranteed these bonds.  
However, the primary reason for the low rate of return demanded by investors is that, under 
normal conditions, the risk of these investments is very low.  The only major default by a publicly 
owned electricity utility in a developed country was the collapse of the Washington Public Power 
Supply System in the early 1980s, following the failure of a massive project to build five nuclear 
power stations. 
By disaggregating the industry, the National Electricity Market created new sources of risk. Most 
notably, fluctuations in the pool price created risks for generators (who lost money when prices 
were low) and for retailers (who lost money when prices were high). Under the previous 
integrated system these gains and losses netted out automatically. By contrast, the NEM 
required either a complex system of hedging markets or the integration of generators and 
retailers to form ‘gentailers’. Neither worked perfectly and the resulting costs were passed on to 
consumers. 
By contrast, the risk associated with the regulated monopoly components of the industry, 
transmission and distribution, remained low.  The standard method of regulation involved fixing 
an allowable revenue based on an estimate of the efficient costs of operation.   
The dominant component of efficient costs was the need for a return to capital. Under National 
Competition Policy, regulators were required to set a rate of return derived from private 
enterprises. This normally involved setting a ‘Weighted Average Cost of Capital’ which was 
substantially higher than the true cost of capital for private firms, let alone the government bond 
rate that had previously formed the basis of electricity pricing. 
The result of the requirement for excessive rates of return is that distributors have had a strong 
incentive to ‘game’ the system. This is a two-step process. First, distributors make arguments 
that the required level of capital investment, to which the rate of return is applicable, is very high. 
Then, to the extent possible within a given regulatory period, they under-invest and claim to have 
made gains in efficiency. The success of this process can be seen from the fact that the market 
value of distribution assets is substantially greater than the value imputed by regulators.  
 
5 Transmission, interconnectors and the National Grid 
The problems of relying on private investment to determine the structure of an infrastructure 
network are even more severe in relation to long-distance transmission grids than they are in 
relation to distribution. Conceptually at least, the problem of distribution is relatively simple. The 
core requirement is that each house or business in a given service area should be connected to 
the electricity supply and that the network should have sufficient capacity to service the (relatively 
predictable) demand for electricity.  
By contrast, a transmission network must connect widely disparate generators to a variety of 
local distribution networks.  Because the demand for transmission is a 
residual demand, reflecting imbalances between local supply and demand it is 





with the consequences of failures in generations and networks. As a result, flows of electricity 
may vary sharply and unpredictably in different directions. 
 
6 Failures of the National Grid and the inevitability of 
government responsibility 
Recent failures in the National Grid, and their political consequences illustrate the point that, 
despite the rhetoric of privatisation and competition, governments are ultimately responsible for 
maintaining the reliability of power supplies. Under a privatised system, the government bears 
the costs of system failures, but receives no offsetting return. 
6.1 South Australian blackout 
Severe storms in September 2016 led to a blackout causing almost the entire state of South 
Australia to lose electricity supply.  The blackout was the result of multiple failures in the 
transmission system, including the power lines and software linking wind farms to the grid.  
Conservative politicians and media commentators seized on the latter fact to draw a spurious link 
between renewable energy and the vulnerability of the grid to disruption.  The underlying 
problem, however, was that the system was insufficiently resilient to cope with such an event. 
6.2 Portland Smelter 
The pattern was repeated in December 2016 when a fault in the Victorian transmission system 
caused a sudden loss of power to the Portland aluminium smelter, with severe damage to 
potlines resulting in the closure of most of the smelter’s operations. The fault also interrupted the 
transmission of electricity from Victoria (generated by coal-fired power stations) to South 
Australia, which was, however able to maintain supply from its own (wind and gas-fired) 
generators. In both cases, the problems lay, not with the generators but with the transmission 
network and the management of the Grid. 
The idea that the performance of an infrastructure system as vital as the National Grid can be 
treated as a problem of market design, in which private firms operate under the guidance of a 
technical regulator, is a nonsense. When the system fails, governments will inevitably be held 
accountable. Under the current system, with no capacity for systematic public management of 
the grid, the response will inevitably be one of short-term panic. 
6.3 Basslink failure 
The fragility of the current Grid is illustrated by yet another failure in the transmission system. 
The Basslink interconnector between Tasmania and Victoria, which broke down in December 
2015 and was not restored to service until June 2016.    
No system is immune to technical failures like the breaking of an undersea cable. But the 
problems of Basslink were compounded by the fact that Basslink is owned by a foreign ‘special 
purpose vehicle’ the Keppel Infrastructure Trust, which in turn is part-owned by the Singapore 
government. The failure of Basslink, and the unwillingness of its main customer, the publicly 
owned Hydro Tasmania, to pay for the facility until it was compensated for the breakdown, 
brought Keppel to the brink of bankruptcy. This in turn raised the risk that the maintenance of 
the link might be neglected as insolvency approaches, raising the danger of 
further breakdowns. 
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A number of options are being considered, notably including a purchase of the link by Hydro 
Tasmania, or increased regulation. These are, however, half measures. Fixing the Basslink 
problem should be the first step towards a National Grid. 
 
7 A National Grid 
The ultimate goal of a National Grid would be the establishment of a unified system combining 
the current roles of the Australian Energy Market Operator, as they apply to electricity with the 
ownership and control of state transmission systems and interconnectors. As at present, AEMO 
would develop plans for the maintenance and expansion of the grid, and the construction of 
interconnectors would be undertaken by competitive tender. Where appropriate maintenance and 
operational functions would also be subject to tendering. However, ownership and control of the 
Grid would be public. 
A publicly owned National Grid would be responsive to concerns about sustainability and system 
reliability, and would allow for the integration of network planning with policy decisions regarding, 
for example, the replacement of coal-fired electricity. At present, while AEMO anticipates and 
responds to such developments its processes are entirely separate from those driving climate 
policy. 
7.1 The path to a National Grid 
As a starting point, the National Grid should begin with the compulsory acquisition of the most 
important interconnectors; Heywood (between Victoria and SA) and Basslink (between Tasmania 
and Victoria). The existing system of light-handed regulation has clearly failed here as it has 
internationally.  
http://www.reuters.com/article/utilities-unplugged-renationalisation-idUSL6N0KH2QQ20140119  
The next step towards a national grid should be a commitment that newly constructed 
interconnectors should be publicly owned and managed. The indirect process of planning 
currently in operation should be replaced with a coherent policy integrating the need for reliable 
electricity supply with the management of the process of decarbonization. Over time, operational 
control should be extended to encompass the entire system of interconnection and transmission, 
regardless of ownership. 
Private owners of existing components of the grid should be offered the chance to sell their 
assets to the publicly owned Grid.  Over time, returns to private owners should be pushed down 
towards the government bond rate with a corresponding reduction in risk and variability.  
Financing of the process is straightforward. The rates of return currently earned by private firms 
are well in excess of the government’s cost of long term borrowing. This gap is unlikely to be 
closed completely. Hence, purchases can be financed by the issue of bonds, and the revenue 
from the assets will be sufficient both to service interest costs and to repay the principal over 
time.  
A gradual process of this kind should be sufficient to return most of the grid to public ownership.  







While the need for public ownership and control is most urgent in relation to transmission, most 
of the same arguments apply to the distribution network as a whole. Electricity networks are 
natural monopolies. Despite the hopes of market liberal reformers, no satisfactory system of 
regulation for private (or corporatised) natural monopolies has emerged from decades of policy 
experiments since the 1980s. 
Restoring public ownership of distribution monopolies is the only tenable solution in the long run. 
The first step should be a reduction in the regulated rates of return for distribution monopolies to 
reflect the fact that these returns carry little or no risk.  
The excess profits associated with current regulatory practices are reflected in the fact that 
market valuations of distribution monopolies show a substantial premium over the valuations of 
the regulated asset base used in determining allowable prices.  This implies that the appropriate 
rate of return for regulated monopolies should be lower than that implied by the private sector 
model. 
 
9 Renewable energy 
The failure of market-oriented electricity reform suggests we need continuing public involvement 
in both generation and distribution. In a decarbonising energy system, this can’t happen without 
public investment in renewable energy. Such investments benefit the public in a diversified 
portfolio of publicly-owned generation assets 
The situation is particularly urgent because of the continued attacks on renewable energy by the 
Abbott-Turnbull government.  The sovereign risk generated by Abbott and Turnbull has reduced 
private investment, leading some retailers paying penalties rather than meeting their obligations 
to purchase renewable energy certificates. State investment in renewable energy would help to 
fill the gap created by the mismanagement of the issue at the national level. 
Another possibility is that governments could innovate in financing of rooftop solar. Australia lags 
in this area compared to the United States. 
 
10 Concluding comments 
A publicly owned National Grid might seem unthinkable. Yet it is the only coherent response to 
the failure of neoliberal electricity reform, just as the establishment of a publicly owned National 
Broadband Network was the only feasible response to the failure of telecommunications reform. 
And, in the light of the political upheavals of 2016, the idea that any political possibility should be 
dismissed as unthinkable appears obsolete. 
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